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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pro-life legislation was at the forefront of Ohio’s political agenda 
for 2011.  With newly elected Republican governor John Kasich,1 a 
Republican-dominated Ohio House of Representatives,2 and a 
Republican-dominated Ohio Senate,3 several pro-life bills have been 
considered, debated, and ultimately enacted into law by the Ohio 
Legislature.  These laws have progressively chipped away at a woman’s 
* Jessica L. Knopp received her law degree in 2012 with honors from The University of Akron
School of Law.  Ms. Knopp dedicates this Comment to Professor Tracy A. Thomas at The 
University of Akron School of Law.  Professor Thomas served as the inspiration and support for this 
Comment.  During her time in law school, Ms. Knopp was privileged to work under and with 
Professor Thomas, who shares Ms. Knopp’s passion for advancing women’s legal issues and rights.  
Ms. Knopp is currently employed as an attorney in Akron, Ohio.  This Comment has been edited 
and adapted for online publication with the Akron Journal of Constitutional Law & Policy.  The full 
version will be available in an upcoming issue of the Akron Law Review. 
1. About: John R. Kasich Governor of Ohio, OHIO.GOV (last visited Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://governor.ohio.gov/About/GovernorKasich.aspx. 
2. Members Displayed by Name, WELCOME TO THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF 
THE 129TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY (last visited Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://www.house.state.oh.us/index.php?option=com_displaymembers&Itemid=57. 
3. The Ohio Senate, THE 129TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OHIO SENATE MEMBERS (Sept. 16,
2012) http://www.ohiosenate.gov/directory.html. 
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right to an abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.4 
Perhaps the most controversial piece of pro-life legislation 
introduced in 2011 was Ohio’s House Bill 125 (“H.B. 125”),5 commonly 
referred to as “The Heartbeat Bill.”6  If passed into law, H.B. 125 would 
require physicians to check the fetus of a pregnant woman for a 
“heartbeat.”7  If the fetus had any detectable cardiac activity, the 
physician would be required to inform the woman in writing, and the 
woman would be required to sign a form acknowledging the fetal 
cardiac activity.8  Additionally, if the fetus is found to have cardiac 
4. For example, H.B. 78/S.B. 72, The Viable Infants Protection Act, prohibits an abortion
after twenty weeks if the physician determines that the fetus is “viable.”  S.B. 72, 129th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted). 
H.B. 298/S.B. 201 re-prioritizes federal family planning dollars distributed to state health 
centers that promote “family planning services.”  This bill has the practical effect of 
allocating federal funds to organizations like Planned Parenthood last.  See H.B. 
298/S.B. 201, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted).  See also Defund 
Planned Parenthood, OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.ohiolife.org/defund-planned-
parenthood/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
H.B. 153, signed into law in 2011, bans the performance of abortions in public hospitals 
and prohibits abortion coverage in insurance plans for public employees.  It also requires 
the Ohio Department of Health to apply for federal abstinence education grants.  See 
Am. Sub. H.B. 123, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_153_EN_N.html.  For final 
analysis, see STAFF OF OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM., 129TH GEN. ASSEMB., REG. SESS., 
FINAL ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 2011), available at 
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses129/11-hb153-129.pdf. 
5. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_125_PH_Y.pdf. 
6. See Heartbeat Bill, HEARTBEATBILL.COM, http://www.heartbeatbill.com (last visited
Sept. 22, 2012) (“We invite you to participate in our most powerful lobbying effort yet—we are 
going over their heads—directly to God!”); Aaron Marshall, Ohio Senate Republicans Plan to Move 
‘Heartbeat’ Bill, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 25, 2011, 7:25 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/11/senate_republicans_planning_to.html; Darrel 
Rowland, Ohio Voters Evenly Split on ‘Heartbeat Bill,’ THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 19, 2012, 
2:08 PM), available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/01/19/quinnipiac-poll-
heartbeat-bill-fracking.html.  
7. H.B. 125 (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(B)(2)) (“‘Fetal heartbeat’ means cardiac
activity or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart within the gestational 
sac . . . (C)(1) Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this division, 
no person shall perform an abortion on a pregnant woman prior to determining if the fetus the 
pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable fetal heartbeat.”). 
8. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(D)(2)) (“If the person who intends to perform
an abortion on a pregnant woman detects a fetal heartbeat in the unborn human individual that the 
pregnant woman is carrying, no later than twenty-four hours prior to the performance of the 
intended abortion, both of the following apply: (a) The person intending to perform the abortion 
shall inform the pregnant woman in writing that the unborn human individual that the pregnant 
woman is carrying has a fetal heartbeat and shall inform the pregnant woman. . .to the best of the 
person’s knowledge . . . the statistical probability of bringing the unborn human individual to 
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activity, the woman would be banned from having an abortion unless it 
was a medical emergency.9 
H.B. 125 does not have a rape exception, which means that a 
woman who conceived through violence would be required to proceed to 
term as long as the fetus was older than just a few weeks.10  H.B. 125 
also subjects physicians to discipline if they neglect to determine 
whether the fetus has detectable cardiac activity.11  Naturally, the 
introduction of such a controversial bill attracted local and national 
media attention.12 
Although H.B. 125 poses significant Fourteenth Amendment 
problems in light of bedrock Supreme Court precedent such as Roe v. 
Wade13 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,14 this Comment analyzes 
how H.B. 125 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution. 
term . . . (b) The pregnant woman shall sign a form acknowledging that the pregnant woman has 
received information from the person intending to perform the abortion that the unborn human 
individual that the pregnant woman is carrying has a fetal heartbeat . . .”). 
9. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(C)(1)) (“Except when a medical emergency
exists that prevents compliance with this division, no person shall perform an abortion on a pregnant 
woman prior to determining if the fetus of the pregnant woman is carrying a detectable fetal 
heartbeat.  Any person who performs an abortion on a pregnant woman based on the exception in 
this division shall note in the pregnant woman’s medical records that a medical emergency 
necessitating the abortion existed.”). 
9. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(A)(6)) (“Cardiac activity means a biologically
indefinable moment in time, normally when the fetal heartbeat is formed in the gestational sac.”). 
10. Id.  See also Al Gerhardstein, Opposition Testimony to HB 125, PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
ADVOCATES OF OHIO (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Gerhardstein.pdf. 
11. H.B. 125 (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(C)(4)) (“If a physician performs an
abortion on a pregnant woman prior to determining if the fetus the pregnant woman is carrying has a 
detectable fetal heartbeat, the physician is subject to disciplinary action . . . “). 
12. See Catherine Candisky, Ohio House Approves Anti-Abortion Bills, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (June 28, 2011), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/06/28/ohio-house-
approves-heartbeat-bill.html; Stephanie Condon, Abortion battles spring up nationwide as states 
test the limits of Roe v. Wade, CBSNEWS (Mar. 21, 2011, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20044823-503544.html; Erik Eckholm, Anti-Abortion 
Groups Are Split on Legal Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/health/policy/fetal-heartbeat-bill-splits-anti-abortion-
forces.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www; Ann Sander, Abortion Foes Push Fetal 
Heartbeat Bills in States, MSNBC (Oct. 12, 2011, 3:31:17 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44879242/ns/politics-more_politics/t/abortion-foes-push-fetal-
heartbeat-bills-states/UFaPc45wa20.  
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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II. LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR ABORTION IN OHIO AND UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Abortion in Ohio is defined as “the purposeful termination of a 
human pregnancy by any person, including the pregnant woman herself, 
with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead 
fetus or embryo.”15  Absent certain exceptions, after a fetus is viable, 
abortion procedures are prohibited.16  And generally after twenty weeks, 
abortions are prohibited.17 
In an effort to ensure a woman’s choice to have an abortion is 
informed, Ohio also mandates a specified waiting period for women 
seeking to have an abortion and requires dissemination of certain 
information prior to having the procedure.  These laws are frequently 
dubbed “informed consent provisions.”18  Ohio, and particularly the City 
of Akron, has been the catalyst for many of the nation’s informed 
consent provisions. 
In 1983, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health19 
examined the constitutionality of ordinances designed to prevent a 
woman from obtaining an abortion absent the recognition of certain 
information.20  The ordinances mandated that an abortion could only be 
performed in a hospital setting; required a pregnant woman to wait 
twenty-four hours prior to having an abortion to deliberate over the 
decision; required the physician to inform the woman about the 
development of the fetus, the status of her pregnancy, and physical and 
emotional complications that may result from pregnancy; and required 
the physician to give the woman a list of agencies that could assist with 
adoption and childbirth.21  The City of Akron presented two arguments: 
(1) providing a woman with this information was part of the “informed 
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.11 (West 2012). 
16. Id. § 2919.17(A).
17. Id.§ 2919.18(A)(1).
18. Christine L. Raffaele, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by Which Providers
of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119 
A.L.R.5th 315 (2004). 
19. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
20. Id. at 421-23. 
21. Id.  Just four years previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio found these Akron ordinances unconstitutional in Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. 
City of Akron, 479 F.Supp 1172 (N.D. Ohio  1979).  The district court held unconstitutional the 
“truly informed consent” provisions of the ordinance, which required the physician to give the 
pregnant woman a detailed description of the “anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
particular unborn child . . . .”  Id. at 1203.  The court reasoned that this provision violated the 
woman’s right to privacy and went “far beyond what is permissible in pursuance of [the State’s] 
interest.”  Id. 
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consent” process because it made her decision to have an abortion more 
informed, and (2) these ordinances protected the life of the woman.22 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Akron’s ordinances 
as unconstitutional,23 the Court reconsidered similar ordinances in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, finding some informed consent 
provisions constitutional.24  In Casey, a twenty-four hour waiting 
period25 and a statute that required the pregnant woman to receive 
certain information, including information about adoption and childbirth, 
were upheld as constitutional.26  Since Casey, Ohio has enacted many 
informed consent provisions designed to “ensure that the woman’s 
choice is informed” and “designed to . . . persuade the woman to choose 
childbirth over abortion.”27  After the Court’s decision in Casey, Ohio 
immediately enacted a law requiring the same twenty-four hour waiting 
period originally at issue in Akron Reproductive Health. 
In addition to the twenty-four hour waiting period, Ohio has 
introduced other measures to ensure a woman’s choice is “informed” or 
“persuaded.”28  Ohio mandates that a pregnant woman receive certain 
information designed to affect her abortion decision.  For example, the 
woman must receive materials that include information designed to 
discourage her from having an abortion and to encourage her to pursue 
“family planning.”29  Furthermore, since Akron Reproductive Health and 
Casey, States have found new methods to ensure informed consent prior 
to an abortion, such as requiring an ultrasound procedure.30  Ultrasounds 
are commonly used during pregnancy to examine the health of the fetus 
22. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 442. 
23. Id. at 421-23. 
24. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).  See also TRACY 
A. THOMAS, JUSTICE & LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OHIO 179-184 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Alexander, eds., 
2012). 
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885. 
26. Id. at 881. 
27. Id. at 878.  See also Jennifer Y. Seo, Raising the Standard of Abortion Informed Consent: 
Lessons to Be Learned from the Ethical and Legal Requirements for Consent to Medical 
Experimentation, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 359-60 (2011) (arguing that informed consent 
provisions constitute informational manipulation). 
28. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(C) (West 2012).  The information that the State is
required to give “describe[s] the embryo or fetus” and “list[s] agencies that offer alternatives to 
abortion.”  Id.  Additionally, this information must be provided in-person and must take place 
before the twenty-four hour waiting period begins.  Id. 
30. See Carol Sanger, Seeing is Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) (arguing that the use of ultrasounds has become a 
mechanism in the law to deter women from having abortions). 
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and to provide a physical image of it.31  Ohio enacted its ultrasound 
statute in 2008.32  Now H.B. 125 seeks to push the informed consent 
provisions even further. 
Under current Supreme Court precedent, Ohio’s H.B. 125 
implicates serious Fourteenth Amendment issues.  Roe v. Wade held that 
a woman had the right to have an abortion during the first trimester of 
her pregnancy and that this right derived from her privacy right 
embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.33  The Supreme Court then 
used Casey to transform the Roe v. Wade trimester analysis into a fetal 
viability analysis, implementing an “undue burden” standard.  Under 
Casey, an abortion statute is unconstitutional if it seeks to place an 
undue burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.34  An undue 
burden is “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion before the fetus attains viability.”35 
Because H.B. 125 seeks to regulate abortion according to cardiac 
activity, which can occur as early as five to six weeks after conception,36 
it would be regulating abortion prior to fetal viability.37  H.B. 125, 
therefore, is subject to the undue burden analysis under Casey.38  
According to the undue burden test, since H.B. 125 places a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to viability, it 
would be unconstitutional.39  But in addition to its clear Fourteenth 
Amendment concerns, H.B. 125 also implicates problems under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.40 
III. H.B. 125 VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST
31. Definition of Pregnancy Ultrasound, MEDICINENET (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=9509. 
32. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.561 (West 2012). 
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-163.  The Court also listed previous cases that guaranteed 
certain areas or zones of privacy from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  
Id. at 152-53. 
34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
35. Id. at 877-78. 
36. See Concerns Regarding Early Fetal Development, AM. PREGNANCY ASSOC. (Sept. 
2008), http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/earlyfetaldevelopment.htm.  
Five and a half to six and a half weeks after conception is usually a very good time to detect either a 
fetal pole or even a fetal heartbeat by vaginal ultrasound.  Id.  
37. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_125_PH_Y.pdf. 
38. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
39. See id. 
40. See Martha A. Field, Abortion and the First Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 545, 551 
(1996) (acknowledging that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment can provide a 
foundation for access to abortion). 
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AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits Congress 
and the States from, inter alia, passing laws that establish a national 
religion or prefer one religion to another.41  The focus of the 
Establishment Clause is neutrality,42 and some members of the Supreme 
Court have asserted that this neutrality should take the form of a “wall of 
separation between church and State.”43 
Opponents to H.B. 125 believe that the bill would impute religious 
principles on Ohioans by valuing the potential life of a fetus above the 
life of the mother44 and by determining when a fetus becomes a 
person.45  The determination of when a fetus becomes a person 
implicates religious values both for people that believe life begins after 
cardiac activity and for people that believe life begins at the moment of 
conception.  While other First Amendment concerns arise in the abortion 
context,46 this Comment focuses on Supreme Court precedent addressing 
41. U.S. CONT. amend. I.  See Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied
Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1104-10, 1119-26 (1979), available at 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol67/iss5/2 (arguing that the First 
Amendment should be construed to prohibit government establishment of particular political 
ideology). 
42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
43. March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. See Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Ohio
House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Rabbi Emily Rosenzweig, 
Ohio Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice), available at 
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Rosenzweig.pdf; Opposition Testimony to 
the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Ohio House of Representatives, 
112th Cong, 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Allan Debelak, Pastor of Reedemer Lutheran Church in 
Columbus), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Debelak.pdf. 
45. See Testimony–Ohio: to H.B. 125: Senate Health, Human Services, and Aging Committee 
in Opposition to H.B. 125, 112th Cong, 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Pastor David Meredith, Broad 
St. United Methodist Church), available at 
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Meredith_121311.pdf. 
46. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 830-31 
(1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (briefly 
addressing whether compelled speech on behalf of physicians violated the First Amendment); Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 174 (1991) (holding that regulations prohibiting abortion as a method of
family planning in counseling do not violate First Amendment free speech rights by impermissibly 
imposing viewpoint-discriminatory conditions by Government subsidies); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abortion 
and Birth Control § 79 (2012).  
Another unreported effect of anti-abortion legislation is the effect it has on doctors 
willing to enter into the profession.  Lydia Strauss, the Supervisor of Support Services 
for Capital Care Women’s Center in Ohio, in a live interview explained that the lack of 
physicians willing to perform abortions will be an epidemic soon.  Interview with Lydia 
Strauss, Supervisor of Support Services for Capital Care Women’s Center in Ohio (Dec. 
6, 2011).  Regardless of whether proposed pro-life legislation actually passes, it 
contributes to the overall body of media hype regarding abortions and deters physicians 
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the establishment of religion by the state through its abortion laws and 
how that precedent affects H.B 125. 
In a series of cases addressing funding for abortion through state 
and federal medical plans, the Supreme Court routinely dismissed 
alleged Establishment Clause violations.  In Maher v. Roe,47 the 
Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation under which 
Medicaid recipients received payments for medical services related to 
childbirth but not for therapeutic abortions.48  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that unequal subsidization was permissible under Roe v. Wade 
because the regulations did not place any obstacles in a pregnant 
woman’s path to an abortion.49  While the regulations may have 
effectuated Connecticut’s views on abortion, the regulations themselves 
did not impose a restriction on access to abortion.50 
In Poelker v. Doe,51 the Supreme Court found no constitutional 
violation when the City of St. Louis decided as matter of policy to only 
provide hospital services for childbirth and not for abortions in the 
public hospital setting.52  More recently in Harris v. McRae,53 the Court 
considered whether an amendment to the Social Security Act violated 
the First Amendment.54  The amendment prohibited the use of federal 
funds to reimburse people for abortions sought under Medicaid, absent 
some exceptions.55  Plaintiffs challenging the amendment argued that it 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it 
incorporated views of the Roman Catholic Church about the sinfulness 
of abortion and the time at which life begins.56  The plaintiffs also 
argued that the amendment violated the Free Exercise Clause by 
preventing a woman from having an abortion as an exercise of her 
religious beliefs under Protestant or Jewish faiths.57 
from entering the profession because of its controversy.  Id.  Ms. Straus stated that all of 
the abortion-providing physicians she works with in Ohio are older and seeking to retire 
soon, but there are no newer physicians that are willing to enter the practice.  Id.  Based 
upon Ms. Straus’s experience in the field, she believes that even if abortion remains legal 
in Ohio prior to viability, the lack of physicians willing to perform the procedure will be 
an epidemic soon.  Id. 
47. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 474. 
50. Id. 
51. Poekler v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
52. Id. at 521. 
53. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
54. Id. at 302-311. 
55. Id. at 302. 
56. Id. at 318-319. 
57. Id. at 311-19. 
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Without conducting a lengthy analysis, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the First Amendment claims in Harris, reasoning that a statute 
does not violate the First Amendment simply because “it happens to 
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.”58  To 
illustrate its point, the Court reasoned “that [although] the Judeo-
Christian religions oppose stealing [that] does not mean that a State . . . 
may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws 
prohibiting larceny.”59  The Court then categorized the amendment as a 
“reflection of traditionalist values towards abortion”60 which, without 
more, did not violate the Establishment Clause.61 
Maher, Poelker, and Harris demonstrate how the Supreme Court 
has rejected Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause arguments 
against antiabortion laws despite the role of religion in the abortion 
debate.62  However, H.B. 125’s religious concerns are distinguishable 
from the laws at issue in Maher, Poelker, and Harris because H.B. 125 
directly places an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. 
The Court in Maher, for example, upheld a restriction on funding for 
abortion, reasoning that, although funding allocation affected abortion, 
the funding itself did not place an obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion.63  H.B. 125, however, not only places an obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion, but it also seeks to make the 
decision for the woman.64 
Establishment of religion concerns were also briefly touched upon 
in Roe v. Wade and Casey.  Roe v. Wade recognized that abortion must 
be a constitutional issue: 
One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges 
of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life 
and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes 
58. Id. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)).  See also Crossen 
v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 840 (6th Cir. 1971) (declining to address the argument that an
abortion law “violates the establishment clause . . . in that it enacts as law the religious beliefs of 
certain groups not held by other persons.”). 
59. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 319-20. 
62. See John Morton Cummings Jr., The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The Establishment
Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1217-1218 (1990); David R. 
Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479, 479 
(1990). 
63. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 464 (1977). 
64. But see Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that laws informed by 
religious moral premises generally do not, by that fact alone, violate the First Amendment). 
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and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s 
thinking and conclusions about abortion . . . . Our task, of course, is to 
resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of 
predilection.65 
Additionally, Casey recognized that people will always disagree about 
the “profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy” and recognized that “[s]ome of us as individuals find 
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that 
cannot control our decision.”66  The Court went on to state again that 
abortion is a constitutional, not a religious, issue.67  The Court also 
recognized that the only religious aspect that should be involved in the 
abortion decision is the woman’s own spirituality.68 
Opponents to H.B. 125 believe the bill violates the First 
Amendment because it effectively values the life of the fetus as coequal 
with or above the life of the mother, a valuation inconsistent with the 
religious beliefs of many people.69  Jewish Rabbi Emily Rosenzweig, for 
example, has argued that H.B. 125 directly opposes the Jewish faith by 
valuing the potentiality of the fetus above the health and welfare of an 
already-living woman.70  In the Jewish faith, Exodus 21:22-23 
distinguishes the legal status of the fetus as less than that of the pregnant 
woman by assigning a financial penalty for the death of the fetus but a 
capital penalty for the death of the woman.71  According to Jewish 
Babylonian Talmud, Chullin 58a, rabbis are taught that the fetus is the 
thigh of its mother.  The pregnant woman is the person, and the fetus is 
part of her body.72  Because H.B. 125 seeks to prevent a woman from 
having an abortion after the detection of cardiac activity absent only a 
medical emergency, it therefore equates the value of the woman’s life 
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
66. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
67. Id. (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”). 
68. Id. at 852 (“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”).  
69. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Religious Coalition for Reprod. Choice et al. in
Support of Respondent at 10, 21, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830) (arguing 
that Nebraska’s statute banning partial-birth abortion “has unconstitutionally imbedded into law 
certain religious beliefs over others” though framing the legal issue as one of “individual 
conscience”). 
70. Rosenzweig, supra note 44.
71. Id. (citing Exodus 21:22-23 (”If people are fighting and hit a pregnant woman and she
gives birth prematurely but there is no serious injury, the offender must be fined whatever the 
woman’s husband demands and the court allows.  But if there is serious injury, you are to take life 
for life . . . .”)). 
72. Rosenzweig, supra note 44.
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with the fetus, directly contradicting Jewish beliefs. 
Some followers of Christian-based faiths also believe H.B. 125 
encroaches on their religious beliefs and therefore violates the Establish 
Clause.  For example, Methodist Pastor David Meredith provided 
opposition testimony on behalf of Methodists and does not support H.B. 
125.73  The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church requires 
Methodists to respect the life of the mother who may be severely 
damaged from an unacceptable pregnancy.74  Some members of the 
United Church of Christ are similarly opposed to H.B. 125 because it 
contradicts The Sixteenth General Synod of the United Church of Christ, 
which “uphold[s] the right of men and women to have access to 
adequately funded family planning services, and to safe, legal abortions 
as one option among others.”75  By prohibiting women from accessing 
these services, H.B. 125 would establish the parameters by which some 
Christians practice their faith in the abortion context. 
Pastor Allan Debelak of Redeemer Lutheran Church in Columbus, 
Ohio stated that the “sanctity of life” has so many meanings to the 
various Christian faiths.  To Lutherans the “sanctity of life” means 
considering more “than the state of the fetus.”76  Reverend Robert 
Molsbury, the Conference Minister for the Ohio Conference of the 
United Church of Christ, perhaps sums up many of these Christian 
opponents’ views best by stating, “House Bill 125 reflects an extreme 
expression of Christianity that even I, a faithful, practicing Christian, 
would find oppressive if it were to be enacted into law.”77 
The specific language used in H.B. 125 suggesting that the life of a 
fetus begins at a certain point in time also raises Establishment Clause 
concerns.  Because America is home to many religions, religious 
diversity precludes a unanimous sectarian view of when life actually 
begins.78  Reflecting on the Texas abortion laws that established life as 
73. Meredith, supra note 45. 
74. Id. 
75. Opposition Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B. 125 before the
Ohio Senate, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Reverend Robert Molsberry, Conference 
Minister for the Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ), available at 
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Molsberry121311.pdf. 
76. Debelak, supra note 44. 
77. Molsberry, supra note 75. 
78. Brief Amicus Curiae for American Jewish Congress at 11-17, Webster v. Reprod. Health
Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No.88-605).  Views regarding abortion defy unanimity, even 
within sects.  Id.  While many Roman Catholics reject abortion, some allow it under certain 
circumstances.  Id.  Baptists generally consider their opposition to abortion as non-binding.  Id.  The 
Episcopal Church continues to support a woman’s right to have an abortion, as do the Presbyterians, 
who focus on viability.  Id.  Many Protestant theologians maintain that life does not begin at 
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beginning at conception, Justice Harry Blackmun famously stated that 
the Court is not in a position to speculate on “the difficult question of 
when life begins” because not even those trained in medicine, 
philosophy, and theology are able to arrive at a consensus.79  For this 
reason, the Court in Roe v. Wade and in Casey drew the line of 
constitutionality at fetal viability—because the precise determination as 
to when life begins is impossible to make in light of Americans’ varying 
religious views.  Furthermore, the fetal viability line is a practical and 
legal line, not a religious line, and it allows States to prohibit abortions 
after viability because that is when the State’s interest in preserving life 
becomes compelling.80  The Court in Roe v. Wade reasoned that viability 
is the appropriate demarcation because “the fetus then presumably has 
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”81 
Although H.B. 125 does not attempt to redefine viability as the 
moment of detectable cardiac activity,82 it seeks to proscribe abortion at 
a point in time much earlier than viability as defined in Roe v. Wade.  
Some Christians take issue with this determination.  For example, Pastor 
Meredith believes that abortion is consistent with Christian principles in 
certain situations and that H.B. 125 seeks to unconstitutionally espouse 
certain Christian religious principles on others by making a blanket 
determination for all persons as to when life begins.83  This 
determination also affects persons on the opposite side of the spectrum, 
including religious pro-life groups, who believe that life begins prior to 
detectable cardiac activity and prior to viability. 
Ohio Right to Life (“ORTL”), Ohio’s largest and long-serving pro-
life non-profit, is a religious group that believes a fetus is a person from 
the moment of conception and not from the point at which cardiac 
activity is detectable.84  ORTL routinely works with elected officials to 
draft and pass laws advocating for the fetus’s right to life, arguing that 
“[t]he right to life is the most fundamental of all our liberties as 
Americans and as God’s creation.”85  ORTL does not support H.B. 125 
conception, as do many Jewish groups.  Id. 
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
80. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); Cummings Jr.,
supra note 62, at 1234-1237. 
81. 410 U.S. at 163. 
82. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacting OHIO REV.
CODE § 2919.19(A)(5)). 
83. Meredith, supra note 45. 
84. Ohio Right to Life Mission, OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.ohiolife.org/mission-and-
beliefs (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
85. Ohio Right to Life Mission: “Who We Are Video,” OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE,
http://www.ohiolife.org/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (“The right to life is the most 
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in its current form because it is not a conception-based bill.  If H.B. 125 
were a consent-only bill, thus requiring the woman to only be informed 
about the presence of a fetal heartbeat, then the organization would 
support the bill because it is requiring the woman to make a decision 
regarding an abortion based upon all the available information.86  
However, ORTL’s position for nearly forty years has been that life 
begins at the moment of conception, not weeks later when the heartbeat 
begins.87  H.B. 125 therefore “represents a potential step backwards in 
the truth of the matter,”88 and determining that a fetus is a person at the 
point of cardiac activity, rather than conception, encroaches upon 
ORTL’s religious beliefs.89  Therefore, H.B. 125 implicates religious 
concerns for people on both sides of the spectrum—those that believe 
life begins earlier than cardiac activity and those that believe life begins 
later than cardiac activity—by defining a precise point in time at which a 
woman cannot have an abortion. 
The language in H.B. 125 referring to cardiac activity beginning at 
a biologically identifiable point in time also poses an Establishment 
Clause issue.  The Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services90 addressed similar language to that used in H.B. 125.  In 
Webster, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a series 
of Missouri state laws that sought to regulate abortion.  The preamble to 
Missouri’s law contained “findings” by the state legislature that “[t]he 
fundamental of all our liberties as Americans and as God’s creation,” quote from Stephanie Krider, 
Ohio Right to Life Director of Legislative Affairs.). 
86. Letter from Marshal M. Pitchford, Chairman, Bd. of Trustees & Political Action Comm.
for Ohio Right to Life Society, to The Hon. Lynn Wachtmann, Chairman of the Health & Aging 
Comm., Ohio House of Representatives, at 3 (May 6, 2011), available at 
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_ORTL120711.pdf. 
87. Letter from Marshal M. Pitchford, Chairman, Bd. of Trustees & Political Action Comm.
for Ohio Right to Life Society, to Ohio Life Chapter Leaders, at 2 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohiolife.org/storage/Affiliated%20Chapter%20Letter.pdf. 
88. Id. 
89. ORTL has voiced other concerns regarding H.B. 125.  Id. at 1-3.  ORTL understands the
current Supreme Court case law does not support the bill and believes that a specific legal protocol 
must be followed in order to overturn Roe v. Wade and Casey.  Id.  The organization believes that if 
their pro-life legislation is not well timed it will be held unconstitutional because ORTL recognizes 
that members of the Supreme Court greatly affect the legislation’s success.  Id.  ORTL believes 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan will not support the constitutionality of H.B. 125.  Id.  ORTL 
believes that if the Supreme Court is ready to hold constitutional a heartbeat bill, it is ready to hold 
constitutional a conception-based bill.  Id.  Additionally, ORTL fears more binding precedent 
reaffirming Roe v. Wade that ORTL and other pro-life supporters will have to overcome in the 
future.  Id.  Lastly, ORTL believes that defending H.B. 125 will exhaust much needed treasury 
money and will award thousands of Ohio taxpayer dollars to pro-choice organizations’ attorneys, 
thus ultimately supporting abortion.  Id. 
90. Webster v. Reprod. Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
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life of each human being begins at conception” and that “unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.”91  The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit determined that Missouri’s 
declaration that life begins at conception was “simply an impermissible 
state adoption of theory of when life begins to justify its abortion 
regulations” and was therefore unconstitutional.92  However, the 
Supreme Court determined that this was not law because the language 
was in the statute’s preamble and merely expressed a “value 
judgment.”93  Because the preamble language was a value judgment and 
because of federalism concerns, the Court concluded it was not 
empowered to decide “abstract propositions . . . for the government of 
future cases.”94 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that 
absent a secular legislative declaration, the preamble violated the 
Establishment Clause.95  The preamble, Justice Stevens continued, was 
an “unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no 
means all Christian faiths,” “serve[d] no identifiable secular purpose,” 
and espoused Roman Catholic beliefs.96 
H.B. 125’s first section contains similar language to the preamble 
language of the Missouri statutes in Webster.  The first section of H.B. 
125 concludes that “[c]ardiac activity begins at a biologically 
identifiable moment in time, normally when the fetal heart is formed in 
the gestational sac”97 and later prohibits abortions after the detection of 
this cardiac activity.98  Like the Missouri statutes, H.B. 125 makes a 
precise determination of exactly when life begins for all persons by 
prohibiting abortion after the determination of cardiac activity.  The 
Supreme Court precedent in Webster suggests that this language may be 
91. Id. at 501. 
92. Id. at 503. 
93. Id. at 506. 
94. Id. at 506-07 (quoting Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409
(1900)). 
95. Id. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 566-569 (“As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-month-
gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth. There can be no interest in protecting the newly 
fertilized egg from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not 
yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, that interest is valid.  In fact, if one prescinds the 
theological concept of ensoulment . . . a State has no greater secular interest in protecting the 
potential life of an embryo that is still “seed” than in protecting the potential life of a sperm or an 
unfertilized ovum.”). 
97. Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacting OHIO REV.
CODE § 2919.19(A)(6)). 
98. Id. (enacting OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.19(C)(1)). 
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a value judgment.  However, H.B. 125’s language is not labeled as a 
“preamble” but instead is a part of the statute itself.  In H.B. 125, the 
heading declares that the language underneath the section is based on 
“contemporary medical research,” perhaps attempting to provide a 
“secular purpose” to combat Justice Stevens’ dissenting concerns in 
Webster.  With the new makeup of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
may be willing to view H.B. 125’s language as more than a mere value 
judgment and may instead view it as an Establishment Clause violation. 
Pre-viability prohibition of abortion is the product of religious 
belief in life beginning at the point of cardiac activity, comingling 
religious principles with legal rights in a manner intolerable under the 
First Amendment.  Casey specifically demarcated viability as the point 
of prohibition because it is a fair and independent factor separate from 
diverging religious principles.99  H.B. 125 seeks to depart from this 
constitutionally-drawn line, therefore constituting an establishment of 
state-sponsored religion in violation of the First Amendment.100 
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Ohio has consistently been at the forefront in anti-
abortion legislation, H.B. 125 goes one step too far.  This bill violates 
Ohioans’ First Amendment right to be free from state-sponsored religion 
by valuing the potential life of the fetus over the mother’s life and by 
making a blanket determination for all Ohioans regarding when life 
begins and when it is worth protecting.  In the midst of Ohio’s efforts to 
further its pro-life agenda, legislators must take a step back and evaluate 
the constitutionality of the provisions they seek to impose, reflecting not 
only on Fourteenth Amendment issues but also on how these proposed 
laws violate the First Amendment right of Ohioans to be free from state-
sponsored religion. 
99. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870-71 (1992) (“Consistent with
other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity 
of offering a justification.  But courts may not.  We must justify the lines we draw . . . The viability 
line also has . . . an element of fairness . . .”). 
100. See Dow, supra note 62, at 499. 
